Summary
Understanding the maintenance of cooperation requires an understanding of the nature of cheaters and the strategies used to mitigate their effects. However, it is often difficult to determine how cheating or differential social success has arisen. For example, cheaters may employ different strategies (e.g., fixed and facultative), whereas other causes of unequal fitness in social situations can result in winners and losers without cheating. To address these problems, we quantified the social success of naturally occurring genotypes of Dictyostelium discoideum during the formation of chimeric fruiting bodies, consisting of dead stalk cells and viable spores. We demonstrate that an apparent competitive dominance hierarchy of spore formation in chimera is partly due to a fixed strategy where genotypes exhibit dramatically different spore allocations. However, we also find complex, variable facultative strategies, where genotypes change their allocation in chimera. By determining the magnitude and direction of these changes, we partition facultative cheating into two forms: (1) promotion of individual fitness through selfish behaviour (''self-promotion'') and (2) coercion of other genotypes to act cooperatively. Our results demonstrate and define social interactions between D. discoideum isolates, thus providing a conceptual framework for the study of the genetic mechanisms that underpin social evolution.
Results and Discussion
Within social groups, the self interests of cooperating individuals are in conflict because selection favors exploitive cheaters who maximize their own fitness by performing less of the costly cooperative act [1] . This broad definition of social cheaters can, however, cause confusion because it often leads to the assumption that differential fitness among cooperating individuals can be used as a measure of social success, and hence of cheating. However, differential success in social interactions can arise from many causes. For example, natural selection could favor different ecological or life-history strategies that indirectly lead to varying social success. On the other hand, differences in inherent fitness could be a consequence of different evolved ''fixed'' social strategies that affect both social and nonsocial fitness but have evolved specifically as social strategies. Finally, individuals may also employ social strategies that are facultative, either in the sense that they depend on the specific social partner(s) encountered or in that they are invoked in the presence of social partners but are differentially expressed otherwise.
These issues can be illustrated by the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, a model system for studying cooperation and cheating [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . Upon starvation, up to 100,000 amoebae aggregate and differentiate to form a fruiting body composed of dead stalk cells that hold aloft a sporehead bearing hardy spores [11] . Different genotypes will aggregate to produce a chimeric fruiting body, resulting in potential conflict over which genotype(s) will ''sacrifice'' themselves to produce the stalk and which will contribute to the sporehead and hence have direct reproductive fitness. Perfect cooperation in chimeric fruiting bodies implies that genotypes evenly divide the advantages of spore production and the burden of stalk formation. Consequently, deviations from a uniform division of the sporehead could be seen to indicate social exploitation. In this scenario, genotypes could cheat to increase their representation in the sporehead through two broad strategies: fixed or variable allocation [12] . In a fixed allocation strategy, genotypes have intrinsic differences in allocation to spores versus stalk cells, resulting in differential representation in the sporehead in paired interactions. However, such variation in inherent allocation strategies is not necessarily a consequence of the evolution of differential social strategies. Instead, natural selection could favor different (equally fit) spore:stalk allocation ratios that maximize a potential tradeoff [12, 13] between spore number and dispersal. In contrast, in a variable allocation strategy, genotypes show different spore:stalk allocation patterns when in competition (a chimera) compared to their clonal pattern because of the social interaction. Such facultative cheaters could be recognized as individuals or genotypes that gain disproportionately more spores when in competition compared to that expected given their inherent allocation. These differences could result when the ''winning'' genotype increases its spore production, with the ''loser'' increasing less or staying the same. Alternatively, coercion could occur, with the winner forcing the loser to reduce its spore production while the winner's production decreases less, stays the same, or even increases.
This study aims to disentangle these different scenarios by quantifying the degree to which both fixed and variable allocation strategies contribute to the spore allocation of naturally occurring strains of D. discoideum during social competition.
Variation in Spore Allocation Results in a Dominance Hierarchy It has been shown that natural isolates of D. discoideum form a near linear ''dominance hierarchy'' when developed in chimera from equal initial frequencies [8] . We confirmed this result for six of these clones developed as chimeras in all 15 pairwise combinations (Kendall's test for linearity, d 5 = 0, p < 0.05; Figure 1A ; see also Table S1 , available online). We next tested whether inherent variation across genotypes in allocation to spore versus stalk when developed clonally, in the absence of competition, could account for this hierarchy. We found highly significant differences in total spore numbers across the six genotypes, with a 2.8-fold difference between the highest and lowest allocators, and significant pair-wise difference between all genotypes (one-way ANOVA, F 5,184 = 94.25, p < 0.001; Table S1 and Figure S1A ). This was consistent with significant morphometric differences of spore:stalk volume ratios (see Figure S1B ) between the genotypes (oneway ANOVA, F 5,126 = 22.618, p < 0.001), with the two measurements of spore:stalk allocation showing a significant degree of correspondence to one another (Kendall's tau, t 5 = 0.600, p < 0.05).
The rank order of clones as a function of their inherent spore allocation ( Figure 1B ) is concordant with their representation in the sporehead during chimeric development, except for genotypes E and F ( Figure 1A ). This result strongly suggests that those genotypes that appear most competitively dominant during chimeric development are simply those whose fixed strategy is to allocate more of their cells to spores.
Frequency-Independent Interactions in Chimera
Two predictions follow if the outcome of competition is wholly dependent on inherent clonal allocation: (1) allocation of cells to spores by genotypes within chimera should be independent of input frequency; (2) Allocation of amoebae to spores and stalk for one genotype within a chimera should be fixed and independent of its competitor's genotype. This implies that the relative spore allocation (hereafter referred to as fitness) of both genotypes in an interacting pair should be predictable on the basis of their respective clonal (inherent) spore allocation.
To test these predictions, we quantified the pairwise fitness (w ij ) of all clones during chimeric development across a range of initial genotypic frequencies. Consistent with the first prediction, the competitive interactions between 14 of the 15 pairs were found to follow a fixed fitness model (all p values < 0.005). See Tables S2 and S3 and Figure S2 for the individual patterns, p values, and raw data, plus the Experimental Procedures for details on these models. The simplest explanation for this pattern is that genotypic spore allocation remained fixed during both clonal and chimeric development. However, in contrast to the second prediction, we found that, for most pairs, the observed representation of genotypes in chimeric fruiting bodies was different to that expected from their inherent allocations (Table S2 and Figure S2 ). This implies that, although allocation to spore versus stalk remains constant for both partners within a pair of interacting genotypes, it is variable between pairs. Thus rather than fixed fitness arising from a fixed pattern of spore:stalk allocation, indicating the absence of interactions, this result reveals a complex array of interactions between social competitors, where the spore:stalk allocation of a focal genotype depends on the genotype of its competitor.
Chimerism Results in Increased Spore Production
The above results suggest that individuals facultatively deviate from their inherent allocation during social interactions as a function of their social competitor's genotype. We therefore tested whether total spore production was affected by this change. Chimeric fruiting bodies of 14 of 15 pairs were found to contain a higher overall proportion of spores than expected if there were no interactions, with 11 of these differences being significant (one-sample t tests; see Table 1; see also Table S4 for raw data). Morphometric spore:stalk volume ratio data for the pairwise interactions between three genotypes (A, C, and E) also supported these data (exp a (A+C) = 0.7363, obs a (A+C) = 0.7622 6 0.007, one-sample t test, t 15 = 3.588, p = 0.003; exp a (A+E) = 0.6604, obs a (A+E) = 0.7951 6 0.028, t 16 = 4.768, p < 0.001; exp a (C+E) = 0.5594, obs a (C+E) = 0.7176 6 0.019, t 16 = 8.455, p < 0.001). We draw three main conclusions from these results. First, despite frequency-independent fitness, genotypes within chimeric fruiting bodies interact and display facultative responses to social interactions. Second, both genotypes show a shift in spore allocation that is associated with significant deviations in fruiting body architecture. Third, as most interactions lead to an increase in spore number, there is a correlated increase in total spore production within chimera (see Conclusions).
Quantifying ''Social Success'' Although 50:50 chimeric mixes result in changes in the proportional allocation to spores versus stalk (Table 1) , these data alone do not indicate the direction of the facultative change (C) The hierarchy measured in terms of ''social success,'' i.e., ability to cheat by self-promotion and social coercion. The ''*'' indicates that genotype B is difficult to place in the social success hierarchy and this position is an estimate. Table  S4 for raw data and standard errors); expected allocations (E) are from total spores counts of clonal fruiting bodies and are calculated with Equations 1 and 2. a Significance level 0.10 > p > 0.05. b Nonsignificant decrease in spore allocation.
in allocation of individual genotypes within these fruiting bodies. To determine this, we quantified the competitive allocation of each genotype within each pair, where competitive allocation is a function of both relative fitness and the proportion of spores in the chimeric fruiting body (see Equation 3 ). We then calculated the deviation of competitive spore allocation from that expected on the basis of the inherent allocation of each genotype. The magnitude and direction of the deviation provide a direct measure of the influence of the social interaction on spore allocation (Table 2) . We observed two modes through which genotypes could gain social success via increasing their proportional representation of spores in the sporehead: selfish self-promotion and coercion. The former is recognized as an ability to increase the relative proportion of one's own cells to spore versus stalk and would result in the tendency for competitive allocation to deviate positively, whereas the latter is recognized as an ability to decrease the relative proportion of cells a competitor is allocating to spores, thereby driving it to disproportionately contribute to stalk. This would result in either a negative allocation deviation or a smaller positive deviation for competitor genotypes.
By these measures we detected a broad range of social interactions between the six strains. Most remarkably, we found that all strains could be both exploiter and exploited, with the magnitude of these responses being both strain and pair dependent (Table 2) . Averaging across all paired interactions, 5 of 6 isolates were strong self-promoters, whereas one performed poorly in both social aspects ( Figure 2 and Table 2 ). We found that a genotype's inherent allocation was not significantly correlated with its ability to socially coerce (r = 0.642, 0.05 < p < 0.10) or its ability to self-promote (r = 0.591, 0.2 < p < 0.3). However, we found that the ability of a genotype to self-promote is strongly correlated with its ability to coerce other genotypes (r = 0.955, 0.001 < p < 0.005; see Figure 2 ). Partitioning social interactions in this way enabled a dominance hierarchy to be produced, where genotypes are ordered in their relative ability to self-promote and coerce others ( Figure 1C ). This social hierarchy is based on measures of variable allocation and removes any effects of fixed allocation and differs strikingly from the hierarchy generated on the basis of either relative fitness or inherent allocation ( Figures 1A and 1B) . These differences indicate that the former hierarchies can cause misleading conclusions about the nature of competitive social interactions to be drawn and fail to illuminate the mechanisms of social exploitation.
Conclusions
Unequal representation of genotypes within the sporehead in socially developing species like D. discoideum has been taken as evidence for social exploitation [7, 8] . This conclusion relies on the assumption of a single optimal stalk:spore allocation ratio among natural genotypes, implying that fair cooperation should result in equal division of the sporehead. The results shown here reveal that this assumption is violated in D. discoideum, where all genotypes examined differ significantly from one another in their inherent proportional allocation to spore and stalk during clonal development. One interpretation of these results is that there are widespread fixed cheating strategies [12] . Alternatively, however, differential social success could be attributed to natural selection's favoring of different inherent spore:stalk allocation ratios that each differently optimize a spore:stalk trade-off. This idea is supported by the finding that chimerism may be relatively rare in D. discoideum, implying that natural selection for nonsocial traits may be the primary force in maintaining variation in allocation ratios [3] . Regardless, our results demonstrate that differences in fixed allocation can explain apparent competitive differences between interacting genotypes ( Figures 1A and 1B) .
Although a fixed allocation strategy can explain competitive differences among genotypes in terms of spore production, our results demonstrate that genotypes show significant variation during social competition. These shifts provide evidence for the existence of facultative cheating behavior, indicating that exploitative social interactions appear to be widespread. Using the estimates of spore allocation during social competition, we detected two strategies of social exploitation: selfpromotion and coercion (Table 2) , resulting in a disproportionate shift in allocation during competition. The former is due to a response directly causing positive effects, and the latter is mediated by a form of coercion that reduces competitors' fitness and thereby benefits the coercer.
At present, the molecular mechanisms underlying these strategies remain unknown. The social responses may be passive, where genotypes respond differentially to signals or show variation in receptor sensitivity [14] . However, it is not clear how such a scenario could explain the diversity of responses observed when genotypes are paired with different partners. Consequently, we believe that a more likely explanation for the observed behavior is that, at least in some cases, genotypes recognize and adaptively respond to the presence of nonself during competition. Indeed, self/nonself recognition is known in D. discoideum and other congeners [3, 15, 16] . A central focus of future work will be to identify the signaling systems or pathways mediating these interactions, with diffusible signaling molecules known to affect cell fate, such as cAMP and DIF-1, representing good candidates [17] [18] [19] [20] . We find that most genotypes cheat through self-promotion, a competitive strategy that generally causes an increase in total spore production and altered fruiting body architecture (Tables 1 and 2 ). Although these findings support the idea that chimerism results in increased fitness [2] in terms of total spore production, it comes at a cost to stalk production, potentially decreasing overall fitness. At the extreme, consistent with the intraspecific Red Queen model [21] , it is possible to envision cycles of increasing spore allocation in chimeras eventually creating fruiting bodies with much-reduced stalks and huge sporeheads. In this ''all defect'' strategy, group fitness would decline sufficiently that any additional ''selfpromotion'' would be considered spiteful. Consequently, coercion may have evolved as a mechanism to counterbalance this process by enforcing other genotypes to produce stalk, thereby avoiding this spiteful end.
In some systems, cheating and coercion can be directly mechanistically separated. For example, in many social insects some workers lay eggs (cheating), whereas other nonreproductive workers remove them (enforcement by worker policing) [22] . However, our data reveal that the act of cheating in D. discoideum (producing more spores) is strongly correlated with the act of coercion (making the other strain make more stalk). It is therefore also possible that a single mechanism underlies both traits. This could be a consequence of the fact that social behavior in D. discoideum is intrinsically dependent on cell-cell interactions and a highly coordinated developmental program in which all the cells respond to the common set of signals that link spore and stalk production.
Our findings highlight the importance of distinguishing between fixed and facultative social strategies when considering social behavior. In D. discoideum, identifying genotypes that simply have disproportionate sporehead representation is insufficient to identify cheaters or the method by which cheating occurs. For example, fixed differences in inherent allocation can lead to competitive differences between isolates, but such differences may arise from nonsocial causes and need not imply exploitation. For this reason we believe that facultative strategies that result in changes in the expected fitness of a genotype or its competitor provide the clearest measure of cheating ability. We find that when this is used as a measure of social success, or cheating ability, it is uncorrelated with inherent fitness (allocation). By focusing on how the fitness of genotypes changes as a result of social interactions, we have revealed a broader and more functionally relevant set of competitive and exploitative strategies in naturally occurring genotypes of D. discoideum. Our results highlight the importance of fully understanding the nature of interactions between social organisms for the identification and definition of social genes. More importantly, they provide valuable insights into the evolutionary consequences of the strategies that take place, aiding the application of social evolution theory to real, interacting populations of individuals.
Experimental Procedures
Strain Maintenance, Growth, and Development Focal genotypes (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures) were grown on Schaeffer's sporulation medium (SM) agar plates with Klebsiella aerogenes and developed on 1.5% KK2 (16.1 mM KH 2 PO 4 , 3.7mM K 2 HPO 4 ) agar plates at a density of 1.6 3 10 6 amoebae/cm 2 . Spore allocation was calculated by dividing total spore number by the initial number of cells added to the development plate. Cell Tracker (Molecular Probes; see [23] ) was used to label strains and identify spore genotypes in chimeras.
Sorus and stalk volumes were estimated from digital images of the six strains (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
Determining Fitness and Spore Allocation
The expected proportions for a pair of genotypes i and j after development were calculated on the basis of the null hypothesis that fitness is constant at all frequencies:
where p t and q t are the proportions of genotypes i and j before development, p t+1 is the proportion of i after development, w ij is a coefficient describing the relative representation of genotype i in the sporehead when in chimera with j, and w ji describes the relative representation of genotype j when with i and where p t = 1 2 q t . w ij is a constant that is a function of both genotypes' spore allocation:
where a ij and a ji are the spore allocations of genotypes i when with j and j when with i, respectively. In the case of observed w ij values, a ij and a ji refer to ''competitive allocation,'' measured in genotype mixes. However, when expected fitness was calculated, the value of a ii was substituted for a ij and a jj was substituted for a ji , where the values a ii and a jj refer to ''inherent allocation'' (i.e., allocation when developing clonally). Estimates of w ij and w ji in Equation 1 were fitted by least-squares with data from Table S4 iteratively by finding the fitness values associated with the lowest sum of squared deviations of the observed proportions after development (p t+1 ) from those expected. See Supplemental Experimental Procedures for details of the frequency-dependent model. The competitive allocation (i.e., allocation of the spores in mixed competition) of a genotype was estimated as a function of its proportion of spores in the sporehead (relative fitness) and the size of the chimeric sporehead itself:
where a i+j is the proportion of amoebae becoming spores in a 50:50 chimeric mixture of i and j (estimates of these values are derived from total spore count experiments). The 2 in Equation 3 appears because genotype i makes up only half of the mixture. The deviation of the competitive allocation of genotype i in chimera with genotype j compared to its clonal allocation, d ij (i.e., the variable allocation component for a genotype within a particular pair), was calculated simply as:
Measures of social success were calculated in two ways: ability to selfpromote and ability to coerce. A genotype's ability to self-promote was calculated simply as a genotype's mean deviation (d i ) when in competition with all other genotypes (i.e., the row mean; see Table 2 ):
where n is the total number of genotypes. Under this measure, good selfpromoters increase the relative proportion of their cells that become spore versus stalk, independent of the influence they have on their social partners. The ability of a genotype to coerce other genotypes was calculated similarly, but it is based on the mean deviation of its competitive partners' spore allocation (i.e., the column mean, c i ), rather than its own spore allocation. The deviation is negative so that a genotype that generally depresses others in competition achieves a positive (or less negative) value in its ability to coerce. Under this measure, a successful coercer is able to decrease allocation to spores by other genotypes, thereby forcing them to make more of the stalk.
To test whether there was a significant relationship between self-promotion, social coercion, and inherent spore allocation, we generated significance thresholds for the correlation coefficient by using a random simulation of the allocation patterns (i.e., of the allocation matrix shown in Table  2 ) under a true null hypothesis of no relationship (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
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